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Abstract
Australia has experienced a varied track record on unemployment. For the third quarter
of the 20th century unemployment averaged 2.0 per cent. This is bracketed by average
unemployment rates of 8.6 and 7.4 per cent in the second and fourth quarter centuries.
Explanations of this phenomena vary. In this paper we explore supply side explanations
using a model developed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (LS). We adapt the LS model to the
Australian tax and welfare system and calibrate it to the Australian economy.
Two simulation experiments are considered. In the Þrst we study the eﬀect of varying
the unemployment beneÞt on the level and composition of unemployment. In the second
simulation we examine the eﬀects of increasing the degree of turbulence experienced by the
economy. In the former simulation we Þnd that: raising beneÞts causes a rise in the duration
of unemployment; unemployment rates rise; across voluntary and involuntary unemploy-
ment classes; the rise is relatively larger in the range of low skill workers whose job-search
intensity falls the greatest. Job-search intensity of voluntarily unemployed workers does not
change with beneÞts; and reservation wages of individuals with high skill levels are unaf-
fected by unemployment beneÞts but the reservation wage low skilled workers increases with
the unemployment beneÞt. In the second simulation increasing turbulence in the economic
environment causes an increase in total unemployment and in involuntary unemployment.
However, voluntary unemployment falls, because people alter their reservation wages and
search intensities in response to increased turbulence; overall the average duration of un-
employment rises. Finally, we replicate the LS Þnding that the adverse consequences of
increased turbulence are larger in economies with more generous welfare systems.
We interpret the Þndings reported above as suggesting that the LS model is a useful
tool of analysis and in the Þnal version of the paper we propose to calibrate the model
to the changes in the level of unemployment beneÞts and the progressivity of the income
tax schedule that occured towards the end of the third quarter of the 20th century. Our
objectives will be to to quantify how much of the change in unemployment can be attributed
to these factors and to quantify the extent to which higher unemployment is attributable to
increased turbulance.
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1 Introduction
Australia has experienced a varied track record on unemployment. For twenty eight years,
mainly in the third quarter of the 20th century, unemployment was persistently low averaging
just 2.0 per cent. This period is bracketed by two periods in which unemployment was high and
persistent. There are many possible explantions of such phenomena. The objective of this paper
is to explore explanations that are based on supply side considerations. In a series of papers
Ljungqvist and Sargent have explored the causes of European unemployment in a calibrated
dynamic general equilibrium search model. The emphasis in their model is on the interaction
between individuals search and reservation wages on the one hand and the tax and welfare
system on the other.
Figure 1: Australian unemployment over the twentieth century
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The Australian tax and transfer system is somewhat diﬀerent from the European and Amer-
ican systems studied by Ljungqvist and Sargent. Most notably unemployment beneÞts are
independent of past earnings in Australia whereas they are typically set as a fraction of earnings
in the last job in the European system. This diﬀerence in welfare systems suggests that disin-
centives caused by unemployment beneÞts may vary more by skill in Australia than is the case
with a European style welfare system. This consideration alone warrants studying the extent to
which Ljungqvist and Sargents Þndings can be replicated for the Australian economy.
Our primary objective in this version of the paper is to assess how useful the LS model is
in quantifying supply side explanations of the rise in unemployment. The model which is an
adaptation of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) is set out in section 2. Calibration of the model
to an idealised representation of the Australian economy is discussed in section 3. Simulation
results are reported in 4. Section 5 reports our conclusions.
2
2 Model
An individuals life within the model starts in being born with probability α and each period the
individual faces death with probability α.1 Thus, the model abstracts from population growth.
An individual moves from the cradle into involuntary unemployment where they join other new-
borns together with workers who have been laid oﬀ. The other pools that make up the population
comprise the employed and involuntary unemployed. These pools and the ßows between them
are depicted in Figure 2. The proportions of people in the pools of involuntary unemployed
and voluntarily unemployed are UI and UV respectively. The remainder of the population is
employed.
Figure 2: Employment Flows in the model
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Within each pool, there is a mixture of skill types, denoted by the variable h.2 People can
move from one skill type to the next with the transition probability depending only on their
current skill and not on thir history.3 The idea here is to capture the notion that there is some
element of chance in the accumulation and deterioration of skills. Earnings in the model is
1There are a continium of agents distributed uniformly on the unit interval. Thus α per cent of the population
consists of new borns each period.
2All newborn workers begin with the lowest skill. Skill type is segmented into 21 discrete elements along and
including the boundary values of the interval Ih = [1, 2].
3The transition probabilities of moving from skill level h in one period to h0 in the next (conditional on not
dying), Pr (ht+1 = h
0|ht = h), are denoted by the shorthand measures μu (h, h0) and μe (h, h0) for an unemployed
and an employed worker, respectively. In the event of a layoﬀ, this is μl (h, h
0). After this period of a lay oﬀ,
the stochastic skill level of the unemployed worker is again governed by the transition probability μu (h, h
0).
3
deÞned as the product of wage (or beneÞt) received at each period with the skill level at that
time. Thus, the dispersion of skill aﬀects the dispersion of earnings.
At the end of each period α proportion of the population die. The survivors move to the
next time period and depending on their circumstances face the sequence of events and decisions
shown in Figures 3, 4 and 5 At the beginning of the period the individual learns how their skill
has changed from the last period. The unemployed then chooses a search intensity st ∈ [0, 1].
This search intensity as part of the solution to the intertemporal intertemporal choice problem
faced by all individuals. The other relevant part of that choice decision is a reservation wage
rule.
Figure 3: Sequence of events and choices facing the involuntary unemployed
Nature moves
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There is some probability π (st) that the unemployed receives one wage oﬀer drawn from
the distribution F (w) = Pr (wt+1 ≤ w). The distribution F (w), assumed to be normal with a
mean of 0.5 and variance of 0.1, is truncated to the unit interval and then normalized such that
it integrates to one. It is assumed that π (st) ∈ [0, 1] and is increasing with search intensity, st.
The speciÞc functional form chosen is:
π (st) = μcs
μe
t ; μc, μe > 0, st ∈ [0, 1] . (1)
A worker, in each period faces a probability λ ∈ (0, 1) of being laid oﬀ. The worker who
is not laid oﬀ remains in the same job as there is no scope in this model for the employed to
face alternative wage oﬀers. Workers who are laid oﬀ are eligible for unemployment beneÞts.4
In the original Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) setup unemployment beneÞts were assumed to
4Newborn workers and those who quit their jobs are not eligible for beneÞts.
4
Figure 4: Sequence of events facing the voluntarily unemployed person
Nature moves
Pr(h(t+1)=h’|h(t)=h)
Voluntary 
Unemployment
at end of time t
Draw w Accept
Employment
at w
Reject
Voluntary 
Unemployment
No 
offer
π(s)
1 - π(s)
Figure 5: Sequence of events facing the employed
Nature moves
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be proportional to the workers last earnings. This was a reasonable approximation to the
European situation but the Australian case is diﬀerent. Abstracting from other forms of beneÞts
like rent assistance, the basic unemployment beneÞt is a ßat $360 fortnightly. Thus we set
the unemployment beneÞt as a constant (γ). Aside from the beneÞt level the other policy
instruments in this model are the marginal income tax rates and a suitable salary function
which determines the eligibility of an unemployed worker, who turns down a wage oﬀer, for
beneÞts. If a laid-oﬀ worker rejects a job oﬀer, w, which exceeds the government-determined
suitable earnings will be breached and their unemployment beneÞt terminated.5
Both earnings from employment and beneÞts are taxed. The Australian tax rates are shown
in Table 1. The tax system in the model approximates the six marginal rates with a tax system
that has just two rates. Incomes below Iτ are taxed at rate, τ , while incomes above Iτ are taxed
at rate τρ.6
Table 1: Personal income tax rate schedule, 2000 reform
Threshold, $ Marginal tax rate
0 0
6, 001 0.17
20, 001 0.30
50, 001 0.42
60, 001 0.47
With this informal description of the model in place we can turn to the behavior of the indi-
viduals who populate this model. They choose a sequence of search intensities and a reservation
wage rule to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility of income.
Et
∞X
i=0
βi (1− α)i yt+i (2)
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on the information avialble at time t, β is
the workers subjective discount factor applied to the next periods utility value, 1 − α is the
probability of surviving death from one period to another, and yt+i is the workers post-tax
income from employment and unemployment compensation net of the disutility of job search at
time c (st) , which is increasing in st. SpeciÞcally, the chosen functional form is
c(st) = Acs
σ
t (3)
The formalization of this choice problem via a the Bellman functional equation is set out in
the Appendix. The Þnal part of the model comprises the equilibrium conditions which ensure
5It should be noted that there is no institutional mechanism that speciÞes what a reasonable wage oﬀer which
cannot be declined by a beneÞt-seeker is. The function used here is a characterization of the behavior of a
typical unemployment oﬃcer in assessing eligibility. In particular, we assume that the oﬃcers expectations are
backward looking in that what is a suitable salary which cannot be rejected is some fraction of the applicants
past earnings.
6At this stage increasing the number of marginal tax rates in the model would increase its complexity without
yielding ncreased insights into unemployment.
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that all agents plans are optimal and jointly consistent. The equilibrium conditions, which are
described formally in the Appendix, ensure that production constraints are met and that taxes
are set so as to balance the governments budget.
3 Calibration
A single period in the model refers to a time of two weeks. Table 2 summarizes the calibration
of the various parameters in the model used for simulation. The probabilities of dying and
being laid oﬀ, α and λ, respectively, imply that the expected working life of an individual is
42.7 years and the expected duration of being employed before being laid oﬀ is 4.27 years.7 The
parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] is used to calculate the suitable salary or, which is proportional to last
periods earnings.8 We set θ = 0.7.
Table 2: Parameter calibrations
Parameter description Mnemonics Value
Probability of dying α 0.0009
Discount factor β 0.9985
Fixed beneÞt γ γ ∈ (0, 1]
Probability of layoﬀ λ 0.009
Scale factor in π (s) μc 1
Curvature of π (s) μe 0.3
Scale factor in search cost function Ac 0.5
Curvature of search cost function σ 1
Threshold income for tax progressivity Iτ 0.7
Fraction for calculating suitable salary θ 0.7
Ratio of taxable income in a higher bracket to that below it ρ 1.6261
Probability of retaining the same skill when employed μe (h, h) 0.98
Probability of gaining one skill level up when employed μe (h, h
0) 0.02
Probability of retaining the same skill when unemployed μu (h, h) 0.97
Probability of losing one skill level down when unemployed μu (h, h
0) 0.03
Number of skill levels lost when laid oﬀ μl 99
Variance of a normal distribution with mean 0.5, for a given μl σ
2
μl
0.02
We made a two-step approximation of the Australian progressive income tax system in
Australia The following Þgure shows the actual tax scheme be normalized within the the models
notion of earnings which lies in the interval [0, 2]. As there is no guide to what the maximum
income is in actual data, we take the threshold income of $60,001 to be the maximum relevant
for the model. This latter assumption is justiÞed on the grounds that the model is describing
an economy populated entirely by blue collar workers.
7This is of course α−1 ÷ 52/2 years and λ−1 ÷ 52/2 years, respectively.
8Ig,t (It−1) = θIt−1.
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Income tax schedule
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Figure 6:
The higher marginal tax rate in the model is approximately the weighted average of the
two highest tax rates in the actual schedule, using the threshold income indices as weights.
Similarly, the lower tax rate was approximated by the weighted average of the two lowest tax
rates. The ratio of these two averages gives the value of ρ = 1.6261.9
The two transition probabilities for μe (h, h) and μe (h, h
0) have been set such that for a
person, whilst employed, will only be accumulating skill from one period to another if she is
not laidoﬀ. That is the Markov chain describing skill accumulation has each state h which is
essential, except when h = 21, which then is an absorbing state.10 This yields a banded matrix of
bandwidth 2 with dimension 21×21 which has the elements μe (h, h) along its principal diagonal
except for the (21, 21) position which is 1 (the absorbing state). The upper band consists of
the elements μe (h, h
0). Similarly, the stochastic matrix for skill depreciation, as applied to an
individual if he is unemployed, will be banded, with the principal diagonal consisting of μu (h, h)
and the lower band Þlled with μu (h, h
0). That is the transition is in general only downwards
in terms of skill level when one remains unemployed. However, in this case the absorbing
state is h = 1, being the lowest skill level. The values of the transition probabilities for
skill accumulation are assumed to be close to the transition probabilities of a low-paid workers
earnings in one year, scaled for the models two weeks periods. Data for these are available from
Table 5.1 in Dunlop (2000). We assume that μu (h, h
0) will be slightly larger than μe (h, h0),
implying that the rate of losing ones skill is faster while unemployed compared to the rate of
improving ones skill while employed.
LS suggest that one way to model economic turbulance is to think of workers experiencing
9That is, ρ =
1.7
2
(0.42)+ 0.3
2
(0.47)
0.2
0.7 (0.17)+
0.5
0.7 (0.3)
= 1.6261.
10A state h is called non-essential if there exists a some state h0 such that h 7→ h0, but h0 9 h. That is for
some s > 0, μe (h, h
0)s > 0, but μe (h
0, h)t = 0, for all t > 0.
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skill loss at the time of layoﬀ. This skill loss is modelled via a distribution that ranges from the
lowest skill to skill level that the worker held just prior to layoﬀ. The particular functional form
used is a truncated normal with variance σ2μl , which is conditioned on the workers skill level
imediately prior to job loss. Larger values of σ2μl represent a more turbulent economy.
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4 Simulations
We conduct two sets of experiments relative to what we believe is a Þrst approximation to
the current scheme of unemployment beneÞts in Australia. First, we conduct an experiment
studying the eﬀect of change the level of the unemployment beneÞts on the distribution of
unemployment by skill level. Second, we analyze the impact of a increased turbulence on
unemployment. The later simulation is intended to explore in an Australian setting the idea
that the eﬀects of increased generosity of the welfare system may not be immediately apparent
but can become apparent if the economy experiences increased turbulance.
4.1 Experiment 1: Unemployment beneÞts progression
In the model γ = 0.333 corresponds to setting the unemployment beneÞt to the current level of
$360 per fortnight.11 The cases γ = 0.156, γ = 0.667 and γ = 1 represent welfare arrangements
where the beneÞts are cut to $180 per fornight and raised to $720 and $1080 per fortnight
respectively. To put these in perspective an unemployment beneÞt at $180 per fortnight would
be about 12.5 per cent of average earnings. The actual ratio of unemployment beneÞts to
earnings ßuctuated quite a bit between the end of WWII and 1973 but the lowest ratio in any
year was about 15 per cent of earnings. Thus 12.5 is a reasonable lower bound for what any
Australian government would contemplate. An unemployment beneÞt of $1080 per week would
correspond to about 75 per cent of average earnings and thus, is comparable to European levels
of generosity of unemployment beneÞts. It seems unlikely that an Australian government would
contemplate unemployment beneÞts more generous than those in Europe. Thus, by focusing on
the selected range we can assess the extent to which it is feasible for government to inßuence
unemployment through changes to the level of beneÞts.
As can be seen from Figure 7 higer unemployment beneÞts cause higher unemployment in
the model. For example, doubling beneÞts to $760 per fortnight causes an increase in total
unemployment of four tenths of one percentage point from 6.2 per cent to 6.6 per cent and
increases the average duration of unemployment by about four days from about 13 weeks to 13
weeks and six days (See Figure 8). Providing European levels of unemployment beneÞts would
increase the total unemployment rate by 2.4 percentage points to 8.6 per cent and would increase
the duration of unemployment by Þve and one-half weeks to eighteen and one-half weeks.
One interesting feature of the model is that it suggests that the increase in unemployment
beneÞts that occurred in the early 1970s from about 18 to 25 per cent of average earnings caused
only a modest increase (just under one tenth of one percentage point) in the unemployment
rate. This result is, however, obtained holding the turbulence of the economy unchanged and
as discussed in section 4.2 it may be that the increase in umemployment beneÞt interacted with
increased economic turbulence to produce higher unemployment.
11To calculate this we simulated the economy with the Australian tax system in place and unemployment
beneÞts set to zero. Average earnings in that case are 1.3355 units on a interval [0, 2]. We took the current
beneÞts of $360 per fortnight as being about 25 per cent of average earnings. This suggests that setting γ = 0.333
provides a good approximation, within the model, to the level of unemployment beneÞts in Australia.
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Figure 7: Unemployment rates and beneÞts paid
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Figure 8: Average duration of unemployment by beneÞt level
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By way of comparison the median duration of unemployment in Australia is about 13 weeks
while the average duration of unemployment is closer to 45 weeks. Thus the model does well
at getting the centre of tendency of unemployment durations but does not adequately match
the skewness of the distribution towards longer durations. One interpretation of this is that the
skewness in the Australian unemployment distributions are not equilibria phenomenon and are
thus transient in the sense that they do not occur in the stationary equibria which is the focus of
analysis in this model. However, here transient does not necessarily mean that the phenomenon
is unimportant or quick to disipate.
As might be expected the Australian welfare system in which beneÞts are not related to past
earnings, and thus are not related to skill, causes unemployment to be concentrated among the
low skilled members of the population. Moreover, increasing the level of the unemployment ben-
eÞt to the European level of generosity while maintaining the Australian practice of not relating
the beneÞt to past earnings would increase the extent to which unemployment is concentrated
among the low skilled. See Figure 9.
Figure 9: Unemployment by skill
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
% Total Unemployed Workers as function of skill level, γ = 0.156 and 1
γ = 0.156
γ = 1
Skill Level
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 T
ot
al
 U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
It is of some interest to view the joint distribution of unemployment by skill level and previous
salary as represented in Figure10 for the case where beneÞts are very low (γ = 0.156). New
entrants who have no skills and zero last salary appear as a spike in the Þgure. Unemployment
is concentrated among the low skilled who also happen to have had a low salary in their last job.
This is caused, in the model, by the Australian system of unemployment beneÞts which are not
related to salary in the previous job. While not wishing to claim too much here we view this as
an important illustration of how the welfare system determines the distribution of income and
(un)employment. Of course, there is nothing to suggest that this particular distribution is sub
optimal.
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Figure 10: Unemployment by skill and last salary for very low beneÞt levels
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As is shown in Figure 11 Euoropean levels of generosity within an Australian beneÞt schedule
(ie unrelated to past earnings) would raise unemployment and further concentrate it among the
unskilled and low paid.
As is shown in Figure 12 when beneÞts are set at $180 per fortnight almost all skill levels
select the highest search intensity. The exception relates to the very lowest skilled workers who
disproportionately comprise new entrants. As would be expected in a system where beneÞts are
unrelated to past salary there is no eﬀect of last salary on search intensity.
Introducing European levels of beneÞt generosity into the Australian system reduces the
maximum search intensity (of the high skilled) by more than one half (see Figure 13; note the
diﬀerence in the vertical axis scale when comparing Þgures 12 and 13). The reduction in the
search intensity of low skilled workers is even more dramatic than that for high skilled workers
under Euopean beneÞt levels. This disproportonate reduction in search intensity explains why
European beneÞt levels within the Australian system would concentrate involuntary unemploy-
ment even more heavily among low skilled and low income individuals.
It is also of some interest to note in Figure ?? that because the reasonable salary criterion
is related to past salary there is some relationship between last salary and search intensity.
However, this eﬀect is relatively minor even under European beneÞt levels.
Search intensity for the voluntarily unemployed workers is not aﬀected by the level of beneÞts.
This is because workers who become voluntarily unemployed in the model are not eligible for
beneÞt payments. Thus there is no avenue through which the beneÞts regime can inßuence
13
Figure 11: Unemployment by skill and last salary with European levels of generosity
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Figure 12: Search intensity for involuntary workers under least generous beneÞt levels
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Figure 13: Search intensity of involuntary unemployed with European levels uf unemployment
beneÞts
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their job search decision. As might be expected the level of unemployment beneÞt does not
greatly aﬀect either the level of involunrary unemployment or the its distribution across skill
levels. (See Figure 14).
In contrast, as is shown in Figure 15 the level of unemployment beneÞt has a very strong
eﬀect on the level of unemployment and the extent to which it is concentrated among the low
skilled. Notice that for the low beneÞt scenario the distribution of involuntarily unemployed is
hump-shaped. That is it is involuntary unemployment is not concentrated among new entrants.
In contrast with European beneÞt levels involuntary unemployment is concentrated most heavily
among new entrants and the low skilled.
This result becomes clearer if we also take into account the class of previous earnings of these
unemployed workers. Notice that the large jump in the last Þgure corresponds to workers who
have the lowest current skill levels whose last earnings correspond to a range which is around that
of average earnings. This is shown in Þgures 16 and 17. So the large increment in involuntary
unemployment rate is associated with these workers who were paid close to average earnings
while employed but have the lowest current skill levels. As the unemployment beneÞt paid to
such a group of people rises from a level below what they previously earned to that above it,
the cost of being unemployed would have been turned into a beneÞt of being unemployed, in the
true sense of the word.
15
Figure 14: Distribution of voluntary unemployment by skill for various beneÞt levels
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Figure 15: Involuntary unemployment by skill for various beneÞt levels
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Figure 16: Distribution of unemployment by skill and last salary: lowest unemployment beneÞt
scenario
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Figure 17: Distribution of unemployment vy skill and last salary: European beneÞt levels
scenario
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In the model, choice behaviour is summarised by the reservation wage and search intensity
rules. The diﬀerences in outcomes between beneÞt levels results from the eﬀect of beneÞts on
these two decisions. As can be seen by comparing Þgures 18 and 19 the level of beneÞts has a
dramatic eﬀect on the reservation wage. Increases in beneÞt levels raise the reservation wage.
SpeciÞcally they raise the reservation wage by more for the low skilled and leave the reservation
wage for the high skilled largely unchanged. The increase in the reservation wage is greatest for
those who are low skilled but had high earnings in their previous jobs. This rotation upwards
of reservation wages for the low skilled who had high wages in their previous jobs goes a long
way towards explaining the distribution of involuntary unemployment in the European beneÞt
levels scenario.
Figure 18: Reservation wage by skill and last salary: low beneÞt scenario
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The intuition for this is as follows. For workers who have high current skills as beneÞts go
up, the cost of remaining unemployed becomes less. This would have the eﬀect of inducing a
higher reservation wage, given that if they become employed next period, there is little room
for skills improvement. But at the same time, there is some probability that their skill will
deteriorate by more as they stay unemployed. And if this does happen they would expect
less in terms of a wage oﬀer. So the two countervailing eﬀects on expected earnings or the
reservation wage policy result in a fairly constant reservation wage level despite unemployment
beneÞt increasing, for involuntarily unemployed workers with the highest current skills. As for
the ones with the lowest skill levels, they do not have much to lose in terms of skills deterioration
as they are already at the bottom of that measure. Thus they have more incentive to refuse
low paid jobs as the level of unemployment compensation is increased. So we can see a general
U-shaped function along the dimension of skill level.
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Figure 19: Reservation wage by skill and last salary: European beneÞt levels
0
5
10
15
0
10
20
30
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
Last Salary
Reservation Wage Policy for Involuntary Unemployed Workers, γ = 1
Skill Level
R
es
er
va
tio
n 
W
ag
e
As might be expected the level of beneÞts does not greatly aﬀect the reservation wage of the
voluntary unemployed since they are not imediately eligible for beneÞts. The main avenue of
inßuence is through eﬀect on current behaviour of their future eligibility for beneÞts should they
become involuntarily unemployed. As can be seen from Figure 20 these eﬀects are small and there
is not much diﬀerence by skill between the most generous and least generous beneÞt levels. The
U-shape of the function along the dimension of skill level again is a result of skills accumulation
and depreciation which follows the same argument above. From several Þgures above, we see
that unemployed workers who are not eligible for beneÞts tend to choose the maximum intensity
for job-search. Notice that the reservation wage of a voluntarily unemployed workers is always
less than or equal to that of the involuntarily unemployed worker, for any given skill level.
This is because unemployment episodes are always more costly for the unemployed who are not
eligible for beneÞts. However, despite being ineligible for beneÞts, they would still take into
account pontential future beneÞt payments if the fall into the involuntarily unemployed pool.
Thus it is important for them to secure a job at a high wage rate as they would have more room
to be picky about wage oﬀers the next time they get laid oﬀ. Hence, as beneÞt is raised from
the lowest level considered of $180 per fortnight to the highest $1080 per fortnight there is some
shift upward in the reservation wage function for voluntarily unemployed workers, below.
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Figure 20: Reservation wage by skill level for the voluntary unemployed
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4.2 Experiment 2: Increased Economic Turbulence
Turbulance is measured as an increase in the variance of the skill-loss distribution, σ2μl from
0.02 to 0.03. We consider two beneÞt scenarios viz $180 per fortnight (γ = 0.156) and $760 per
fortnight (γ = 0.5). Table 3 below reports the simulated steady state outcomes under alternative
degrees of economic turbulence across the two beneÞt schemes. The marginal tax rates required
to balance the government budget rise is about 1 per cent higher in the case of γ = 0.5. The
fall in average productivity in both cases are similar. However, the economy does not weather
an increase in the volatility of the environment well in terms of the unemployment rates. The
total unemployment rate rises by 4 per cent when beneÞts are $760 per fortnight (γ = 0.5)
compared to a much smaller increase of 1 per cent in the same rate when γ = 0.156. A similar
pattern happens in the sub-categories of the involuntary and voluntary unemployment rates.
The increase of the spell of unemployment is also greatly increased when the economy is more
volatile, under the case of γ = 0.5. Relative to the benchmark case, the percentage change in
this stastistic is about 4 times larger. Thus with the Australian ßat beneÞt schedule we are able
to replicate the LS Þnding that increase economic turnulance can interact with more generous
unemployment beneÞt regimes to produce substantially higher equilibrium unemployment rates.
Increasing turbulence in the economic environment results in an increase in unemployment
rates for total and involuntary unemployments. Also average duration of unemployment rises.
However, voluntary unemployment falls, beause the voluntary unemployed lower their reserva-
tion wage as a response to increased turbulance. This results in a fall in average productivity
of labor and output. The result is worsened when unemployment beneÞts and corresponding
balanced-budget marginal income tax rates are higher. That is the economy suﬀers more and
becomes less resilient in terms of the unemployment when the welfare state is larger.
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Table 3: Steady-state values for alternative welfare economies under diﬀerent degrees of economic
turbulence
Degree of turbulence, σ2μl Percentage change
0.02 0.03
Tax rate, τ∗ × 100%:
γ = 0.156 3.900 4.300 10
γ = 0.5 1.410 1.570 11
Average productivity (per 2 weeks):
γ = 0.156 1.170 1.130 −3.4
γ = 0.5 1.168 1.130 −3.3
Unemployment rate (involuntary), %
γ = 0.156 3.460 3.590 3.8
γ = 0.5 3.880 4.130 6.4
Unemployment rate (voluntary), %
γ = 0.156 2.590 2.520 −2.8
γ = 0.5 2.590 2.580 −0.39
Unemployment rate (total), %
γ = 0.156 6.050 6.110 0.99
γ = 0.5 6.470 6.710 3.7
Average duration of unemployment (weeks)
γ = 0.156 12.700 12.820 0.94
γ = 0.5 13.620 14.188 4.17
5 Conclusion
We adapt the Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) general equilibrium search model to the Australian
tax and welfare system and use it to study the eﬀects of beneÞt levels and economic turbulance
on unemployment levels and durations. We conduct two simulation experiments. First, we
studying the eﬀect of varying the level of uneployment beneÞts on the level of unemployment
and distribution across individuals with diﬀerent skill levels. Second, we study the eﬀect of
turbulance as measured by the dispersion of the distribution of skill loss at layoﬀ;
The results are encouraging. We can match the broad features of Australian unemployment.
However the model does not capture the skewness of unemployment durations suggesting that
they are not an equilibrium phenomenon. In the next stage of the paper we propose to model
the eﬀects of the changes in the progressivity of income tax rates on unemployment.
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A Model
Both earnings from employment and beneÞts are taxed at the same rate, τ , provided the taxable
income does not exceed a threshold level given by Iτ . Let Ω be the nω ×nh matrix that collect
a sample of gross earnings, ωij ∈ Ω.12 Thus the tax structure is such that net earnings,
ωnetij ∈ Ωnet, is given by
ωnetij =
½
(1− τ)ωij if ωij ≤ Iτ
(1− τ) Iτ + (1− ρτ) (ωij − Iτ ) if ωij > Iτ (4)
where τ is the marginal tax rate and ρ is the ratio of taxable income in a higher bracket to
that below it. Note that if ρ = 1, all earnings are taxed at the ßat marginal rate of τ , and the
income threshold, Iτ , is redundant. If ρ > 1, earnings in the higher bracket will be taxed at
the higher rate of ρτ . Given the normalization of F (w) and skills h ∈ Ih, net earnings would
lie in the closed interval [0, 2] . For a speciÞed level of beneÞts γ ∈ [0, 2], the set of government
policy functions Ig (I) and τ , must be set such that the government budget is balanced. That
is, in an equilibrium income tax revenue covers all unemployment beneÞts paid out.
We can formalize the decision problem which was informally described in section 2 via
the Bellman functional equation. Let V (w, h) be the value of the optimization problem of
the employed worker with wage w and skill h at the beginning of a period. The value of
the problem for the unemployed person who is eligible for unemployment beneÞts is Vb (I, h)
which is a function of the persons past earnings and current skill. The value function for the
unemployed but ineligible for beneÞts is given by Vo (h) which is just a function of skill alone.
The Bellman equations are thus:
V (w,h) = max
accept,reject
(
(1− τ)wh+ (1− α)β
"
(1− λ)
X
h0
μe
¡
h, h0
¢
V
¡
w, h0
¢
λ
X
h0
μl
¡
h, h0
¢
Vb
¡
wh, h0
¢#
, Vo (h)
)
(5)
where
Vb (I, h) = max
s
(
−c (s) + (1− τ) γ + (1− α)β
X
h0
μu
¡
h, h0
¢
× [1− π (s)]Vb
¡
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+ π (s)
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V
¡
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¢
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Z
w<Ig(I)/h0
max
accept,reject
(
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h00
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h00
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¡
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dF (w)
!#)
(6)
12Recall the deÞnition of gross earnings as, ω = wh, the product of wage/beneÞt and skill level. In the numerical
simulations, we discretize the joint wage distribution, by forcing earnings conditional on skill type h to exist on
a discrete grid, to speed up computation. That is we set nω = 51.
22
and
Vo (h) = max
s
(
−c (s) + (1− α)β
X
h0
μu
¡
h, h0
¢
×
(
[1− π (s)]Vo
¡
h0
¢
+ π (s)
Z
w≥Ig(I)/h0
V
¡
w,h0
¢
dF (w)
))
. (7)
By a dynamic programming argument, the maximization of the individuals lifetime utility
is consistent with the maximization of the sum of a one-period utility and the expected utility
of the remaining periods ahead. Thus, equation (5) says that for the employed worker, V (w, h)
is the value attained from maximizing the sum of current utility of post-tax earnings and the
expected next period lifetime payoﬀ in which there is a probability (1− λ) of remaining in the
same job but at some skill level h0, and a probability λ of being laid oﬀ and thus being entitled
to unemployment beneÞts. The value derived from the latter possibility is given in equation
(6). Note that in equation (5), it also says that the currently employed person can resign, which
then yields the value of Vo (h) in the next period; and Vo (h) is given by equation (7).
For an unemployed person eligible for beneÞts, equation (6) describes her utility maximiza-
tion problem. The utility value to this person is Vb (I, h) is the maximum of the sum of current
earnings from beneÞts net of job-search disutility and the next periods lifetime payoﬀ from
either remaining involuntarily unemployed through no job oﬀers or if some oﬀer w ≥ Ig (I) /h0
occurs and is accepted. Or if an oﬀer w < Ig (I) /h
0, comes along, it can either be accepted or
rejected. If it is accepted, the remaining expected lifetime payoﬀ will be conditioned on that
lower wage oﬀer (and there is a chance λ the person can be laid oﬀ again). If it is rejected the
worker is back to being involuntarily unemployed with expected payoﬀ of Vb (I, h
0).
The voluntarily unemployed person, either by resignation from previous employment or
refusal of an appropriate wage oﬀer w ≥ Ig (I) /h0 while unemployed, will not be entitled to
beneÞts, and must maximize the lifetime payoﬀ (7) which is the sum of current (dis)utility of
job-search and discounted expected future payoﬀ of possibly being oﬀered a higher wage the
next period or remaining voluntarily unemployed.
The solution to the dynamic problem in (5)-(7) are pairs of best response functions or decision
rules for the two types of unemployed individuals. These are sb (I, h) and wb (I, h), yielding
the optimal search intensity and reservation wage, respectively, for the unemployed person with
last earnings I and skill-type h who is eligible for beneÞts. Note that there is a distribution
for these two functions as they are taken over the joint distribution of the previous earnings
and skills. Similarly the other pair of optimal decision rules are given by so (h) and wo (h),
for the unemployed person not eligible for beneÞts, which are also distributed according to the
heterogeneity of skill types. These functions do not depend on previous earnings, I, as that is
only relevant to paying out the beneÞt γ to the eligible. The reservation wage of an employed
worker will also be wo (h) since anyone who resigns from a current job will not be eligible for
unemployment beneÞts.
We will compare simulation results from diﬀerent stationary equilibria. A stationary equi-
librium is deÞned as follows.
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DeÞnition A.1 For a given constant unemployment beneÞt γ, a stationary equilibrium in this
model is characterized by a set of government policy instruments {Ig (I) , τ}, optimal decision
rules {sb (I, h) , wb (I, h) , so (h) , wo (h)} and the allocations in time-invariant employment and
unemployment distributions, consistent with individuals maximizing expected lifetime utility as
given in (5)-(7) and a balanced government budget.
This equilibrium is solved as a contraction mapping in the space of income tax rates. That
is, starting with a Þxed tax rate, τ , we solve the problem given for the worker in (5)-(7). We
continue with the next value of τ and Þnd the optimal decision rules for the workers again.
Repeat this algorithm until τ = τ∗ solves both the workers maximum problem and the problem
of balancing the government budget. When the government budget is balanced we attain the
Þxed point τ∗. Note that this Þxed-point is not unique. For instance τ = 1 can also be a Þxed
point consistent with a time-invariant equilibrium, but one where no economic activity occurs.
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